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ABSTRACT   
  
 
We examine the influence of CFO/CEO honesty perceptions on earnings management for the 
largest publicly traded companies in America, and show that visual cues play a significant 
role.  Specifically, after controlling for incentives (i.e. stock-based compensation, bonuses, 
leverage) and opportunities (i.e. auditor independence, internal control deficiencies), 
members of senior management perceived to be less honest engage in higher levels of both 
accruals management and real earnings management. Interestingly, the beneficial impact of 
perceived honesty on earnings quality is most pronounced when both the CFO and the CEO 
are perceived to be honest.  Findings are consistent with our conjecture that both the CFO and 
CEO independently contribute to a firm’s reporting environment.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores whether and how perceived CFO and CEO honesty is associated with 
a firm’s propensity to engage in earnings management. We focus on S&P 500 companies for 
which there already is significant due diligence by both external and internal auditors to explore 
the “gray area” of financial reporting choices. Prior research targets the most egregious instances 
of financial reporting misconduct by focusing on SEC enforcement actions, restatements and 
class action lawsuits even if few instances of fraud are detected, and ultimately prosecuted. This 
creates a self-selection bias that is likely to significantly understate the amount of questionable 
behaviour being conducted by executives (Amiram et al. 2018).  Dechow et al. (2011) show an 
increase in abnormal accruals and a higher probability of manipulation in the years leading up to 
a material misstatement.  Similarly, Jones et al. (2008) find that instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting are significantly associated with discretionary accruals and accrual estimation errors.  
Managing earnings within GAAP may deceive shareholders and creditors even if it is not illegal.  
As such, accruals and real earnings management constitute the lower end of the financial 
reporting misconduct continuum.  
Prior research shows the CEO and CFO set the “tone at the top” for ethical behaviour. In 
fact, 90% of accounting fraud cases in US public companies involves the CEO and/or the CFO 
(Beasley et al. 2010). Financial reporting fraud is almost always perpetrated by groups of 
individuals, led by someone in top management (Anand et al. 2015).  Research on the correlates 
and effects of ethical leader behavior demonstrates mainly positive relationships with a variety of 
followers’ attitudes and behaviors, such as trust, perceived leader effectiveness, commitment and 
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organizational citizenship behavior (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Brown et al. 2005; Piccolo et al. 
2010).  Many subordinates will do as they are told without consideration of the legality or 
ethicality of their actions if they believe they are being loyal when they react to an edict from 
above to make the number at all costs (Wolfe and Hermanson 2004).  As the senior manager in 
charge of financial reporting, the CFO is an ideal position to engage in financial misreporting.  
Yet, the majority of research to date focuses exclusively on the role of the CEO in influencing 
and propagating financial reporting fraud (Trevino et al. 2006).  We concentrate on the CEO and 
CFO to better understand whether and how they independently contribute to a firm’s financial 
reporting quality.  
The determinants of financial reporting misconduct are well-documented in the literature. 
Incentives to manipulate earnings include performance-based compensation (e.g. Healy 1985; 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Efendi et al. 2007), financing and leverage (e.g. Sweeney 1994; Dichev 
and Skinner 2002; Beatty and Weber 2003), operating losses (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Burgstahler and Eames 2010) and strings of consecutive positive earnings 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996).  Incentives can only be acted upon if opportunities to 
manipulate earnings exist.  Prior research, for example, shows increased levels of earnings 
management following the disclosure of internal control deficiencies (e.g. Ge and McVay, 2005; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan, Farrell and Lee, 2008) or as the quality of board and audit 
committee oversight decreases (Efendi et al. 2007; Bilal, Chen, and Komal 2018).  More recent 
research also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between individual traits and firm 
characteristics to explain firm outcome measures (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Bamber et al. 2010, 
Ge et al. 2011, Demerjian et al. 2013).   
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Capital market and contracting motivations are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to 
consistently explain financial reporting misconduct (Amiram et al. 2018).  When presented with 
seemingly identical incentives and opportunities, only some individuals will choose to commit 
financial reporting fraud (Wells, 2004).  According to the “fraud triangle”, a framework 
developed by American sociologist Donald Cressey (1953), a third factor, rationalization, must 
also be present for an individual to commit fraud. Rationalization refers to the ability of the 
perpetrator to justify the fraud to them self to make it acceptable or justifiable. It is an 
unobservable internal cognitive process (Cressey 1953).  The fraud triangle underlies many 
regulatory bodies’ approach to fraud risk assessment, including COSO, the ACFE, the IAASB 
and the AICPA.  According to Wilks and Zimbelman (2004), auditors consider rationalization to 
be the most important component of the fraud triangle.  Surprisingly, the literature to date 
contains very limited research on rationalization, prompting some researchers to call it a relative 
mystery (Hogan et al., 2008; Wells, 2004). We take advantage of recent developments in the 
personality literature to “open the door” behind rationalization.  Our focus on the honesty 
dimension of personality is motivated by the work of Lee and Ashton (2012), and recent findings 
from Murphy (2012) that character predicts misreporting rather than traditional notions of 
rationalization.   
In our main analyses, we use visual cues as proxies for perceived CFO and CEO honesty.  
While the belief that genetics, leading to both untrustworthy-looking faces and untrustworthy 
behavior, has been historically contentious (see Todorov and Porter 2014 for discussion), recent 
research by Slepian and Ames (2016) finds that face-based judgments can be used to predict 
trustworthiness.  Jia et al. (2014) find a positive association between male CEOs’ facial 
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masculinity and various misreporting proxies, including SEC enforcement actions, insider 
trading, and option backdating. 
 In our robustness checks, we also use verbal cues as proxies for honesty. The importance 
of textual analysis in explaining firm outcomes (i.e. profitability, leverage, fraud) is well-
established in the literature. For example, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) examine the language 
of deceptive executives during conference calls and find they exhibit more references to general 
knowledge, fewer non-extreme positive emotions, and fewer references to shareholder value.   
We expect a negative association between perceived honesty and both accrual-based and 
real earnings management. As the CEO and CFO work as a team in an organization, we 
hypothesize that both individuals will independently contribute to a firm’s propensity to engage 
in earnings management.  Consistent with the adage that “one bad apple spoils the bunch”, we 
suspect that the highest quality financial statements are observed in those organizations where 
both the CEO and the CFO are perceived to be more honest.   
We download the photos of CEOs and CFOs from company websites, annual reports and 
Google Images for the S&P 500 group of companies for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013.  We 
obtain quarterly earnings call transcripts from the Thomson Reuters Street Events database.  Our 
complete sample consists of 950 firm-year observations for which both photos and adequate 
conference call data are available.  Each photo is rated for perceived honesty by an average of 18 
MTurk workers, a participant pool run by Amazon.com.  We parse each quarterly earnings call 
transcript into CEO and CFO components, using textual analyses programs to assess perceived 
honesty. 
We first examine the association between perceived honesty and earnings management 
for both the CEO and the CFO independently.  After controlling for a number of incentives, 
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opportunities and control variables, we find a strong impact of CFO visual cues for perceived 
honesty/humility on the propensity to engage in both accrual-based and real earnings 
management.  Interestingly, for our sample, there are no results when examining the impact of 
the CEO in isolation. Of all the accrual-based measures, consistent with Jones et al. (2008), we 
find that the Dechow and Dichev-based measures have the highest association with perceived 
honesty.  
Further, we examine the association between perceived honesty and earnings 
management when CEOs and CFOs for a company are both perceived to be more (less) honest.  
Findings generally support the assertion that matching matters.  More specifically, when both the 
CEO and the CFO are perceived to be more honest, the firm engages in less earnings 
management than when either one or both individuals is perceived to be less honest. Said another 
way, when both the CEO and the CFO are perceived to be less honest, the firm engages in more 
earnings management than when one or both individuals are perceived to be more honest.   
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, through the inclusion of 
both CEO and CFO characteristics in our models, we address the question as to the relative 
importance of the CEO and the CFO in acts of earnings management.  Consistent with recurring 
findings that one unethical individual can impact other individuals (Elias 2004, Pinto et al. 
2008), we find that CFO personality moderates the relationship between CEO personality and 
earnings management propensity.     
Second, we contribute to the growing body of literature interested in the ability of the 
honesty/humility personality factor to account for individual differences in ethical behavior. 
Consistent with predictions from early work on this sixth dimension of personality, we find that 
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perceived honesty plays a significant role in explaining the differential levels of earnings 
management observed across S&P 500 companies.   
Third, research on fraud supports the assertion that most instances of fraud are not one-
time events. Some individuals have a pre-disposition towards unethical behaviour and likely 
behave unethically on a consistent basis (Murphy, 2012).  Since AAERs (the focus of many 
other studies) only represent the most egregious unethical acts and those which the SEC has 
decided to prosecute, we focus our analysis by looking at other actions, namely instances of 
questionable financial reporting quality such as accrual-based and real earnings management.  
This analysis enables us to explore the evolution of unethical behaviour within a given firm’s 
CEO/CFO management team over time, as well as explore the pervasiveness of questionable 
behaviour across the entire S&P500.  It also addresses the call by prior researchers to 
differentiate between legal fraud (fraud that clearly contravenes existing laws) and moral/ethical 
fraud (actions that misrepresent key information in contravention of existing ethical norms) 
(Anand et al., 2015).  
Finally, our findings have important practical implications.  While the importance of 
textual analysis in explaining firm outcomes (i.e. profitability, leverage, fraud) has been 
established in the literature, a paucity of work has been done to explore the influence of visual 
cues on these same firm outcomes.  In a world where information is critical to success (whether 
it be making investment decisions or extending credit to a prospective customer), we find that 
visual cues provide a useful source of information in assessing the quality of a firm’s 
management team.   
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The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 
4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Financial statement fraud is typically explained as a deliberate and rational choice to 
circumvent accounting rules, which results in financial reports that are misleading or deceptive 
(Siegel, 1992).  It involves violating generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), through 
such actions as overstatement of assets, understatement of expenses, overstatement of revenues 
and misclassification of financial statement asset/liability and revenue/expense items (Feroz et 
al., 1991; Beasley et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 1996).  Financial reporting 
choices that misrepresent key information in contravention of existing ethical norms, but do not 
clearly contravene existing GAAP, is considered moral/ethical fraud by Anand et al., 2015. To 
meet the definition of legal fraud, the misrepresentation must be material, committed negligently 
or with knowledge of its falsity, and causally related to the plaintiff’s loss (Amiram et al., 2018).  
Financial statement misreporting exists along a continuum, from earnings management on the 
left side of the spectrum to financial reporting fraud on the right side of the spectrum.  While 
lawsuits can be associated with discretionary reporting choices along the full spectrum, they 
become more likely as one moves from the left to the right (Amiram et al., 2018).   
We examine the determinants of financial statement misreporting on the left side of the 
spectrum, using the fraud triangle as our theoretical framework. Criminologist and sociologist 
Donald Cressey (1953) developed the Fraud Triangle to explain the necessary conditions for 
fraud to occur.  The triangle consists of three necessary elements: 1) incentive/pressure; 2) 
opportunity; and 3) rationalization.  The CEO/CFO team is a natural research focus since: 1) a 
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large portion of their compensation is based on company financial performance (implying large 
incentives); and 2) they collectively possess significant proprietary information about the firm’s 
financial position, weaknesses in internal controls and have the ability to override these controls 
(implying many opportunities) (Zhang et al., 2008; Schrand and Zechman, 2012).  Prior research 
suggests that even if a CEO is not directly involved, he/she may direct or enable others to 
commit financial statement fraud (Ermann and Lundman, 1987; Zahra et al., 2005, 2007).  While 
incentives and opportunities are relatively easy to identify and measure, rationalization is much 
more difficult to assess.  We rely on work in both the accounting and psychology literatures to 
explore new empirical proxies for rationalization.     
Rationalization is difficult to explore because it is tied to the unobservable inner thoughts 
and emotions of the perpetrator (Antenucci et al. 2010).  A number of alternative measures have 
been considered over the years. Albrecht et al.’s (1984) fraud scale model replaces 
rationalization with personal integrity, i.e. “the personal code of ethical behavior each person 
adopts” (p. 18).  Fraud risk assessment is one of the toughest challenges facing auditors 
(Carpenter, 2007; Carcello and Hermanson, 2008; Hogan et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2010; 
Hammersley et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2013; Trompeter et al., 2013).  In fact, only 10% of the 
misconduct cases studied by Dyck et al. (2010) were detected by the external auditors.  In an 
effort to improve external auditors’ ability to detect fraud, auditing standards on fraud risk 
assessment (e.g. ISA 240) thus extend the rationalization component to require formal 
assessment of more easily observable management attitudes. The revised COSO framework 
adopts the same approach. Most recently, Murphy (2012) examines the relation between 
attitudes/character traits and rationalization. Despite the fact that attitude/rationalization 
constitute the same side of the fraud triangle in existing frameworks, she finds that they are 
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different constructs with little direct association: character predicts misreporting while 
rationalization is a consequence of misreporting.    
Although sparse, prior research on attitude/rationalization tends to focus on the extremes 
of CEO personality in experimental settings.  The Dark Triad focuses on three personality traits 
that are aversive but still within the normal range of social functioning: narcissism, 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy.  These personality traits are associated with charismatic 
leadership and a better ability to achieve goals by using influence tactics, making individuals 
with higher levels of either trait more likely to succeed in the corporate world and hold CEO 
positions (Judge et al. 2009; Babiak et al. 2010).  In the context of financial reporting, Majors 
(2016) find that managers with stronger levels of psychopathy, Machiavellianism or narcissism 
report more aggressively than their counterparts with lower levels of the three personality traits.  
Murphy (2012) finds that high Machiavellians (individuals characterized by a disregard for 
morality and a strong focus on self-interest and personal gain) are not only more likely to 
misreport in the presence of opportunity and motive, they are likely to do so in higher amounts.   
These findings provide evidence that the “attitude” component of the fraud triangle holds 
promise in extending our ability to explain instances of financial misreporting.  Little attention 
has been devoted to better understanding the personality of individuals that display lower levels 
of psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism but varying levels of other personality traits 
that can be used to measure their character and personal integrity.  Proxies that can be used in 
empirical settings are also needed to further our understanding of the association between 
character and financial misreporting and examine the generalizability of the existing 
experimental results.  We suggest using the sixth dimension of personality, honesty/humility, to 
do so.  
10 
 
Prior to the year 2000, most personality theorists generally agreed that five trait 
dimensions derived from factor analyses of ratings of trait adjective pairs, the Big Five 
personality model, represent a reasonable compromise that is at least a partially accurate measure 
of people’s personalities (Barrett & Pietromonaco, 1997; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Watson, 1989).  
However, less evidence exists regarding the relationship between personality and behaviour, 
particularly when it comes to financial reporting choices (e.g. Funder 2001; Plockinger et al. 
2016).     
Ashton and Lee (2005) add a sixth dimension – honesty/humility – to the Big Five model.  
Their model is commonly known at the HEXACO inventory of personality traits, or Big Six 
(Ashton and Lee 2005; Ashton and Lee 2008; Ashton and Lee 2010; Blickle et al. 2006, DeVries 
et al. 2009; Hershfield et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2005; Weller and Tikir 2011).  In the words of 
Hilbig and Zettler (2015), honesty/humility is the “quintessential basic trait to account for 
individual differences in (un)ethical behavior”. Honesty-humility is associated with increased 
cooperativeness (Hilbig et al., 2015), fewer sexual quid pro quos (Ashton and Lee, 2008b); more 
moral behavior and honest reporting (Hilbig et al., 2015), and higher integrity and less 
counterproductive work behavior (Marcus et al., 2007; Zettler and Hilbig, 2010).  Further 
research shows that the six personality factors can be found in all languages and cultures (Ashton 
and Lee, 2010; Ashton et al., 2004) and are stable across an individual’s lifetime (Harris, 1995; 
Roberts et al., 2006).  As such, the honesty/humility dimension of the Big Six model may 
provide important insights into the varying shades of CFO and CEO integrity and character, as 
proxies for attitude/rationalization, and their association with financial reporting misconduct.    
Honesty/humility would ideally be measured by having sample CEOs and CFOs 
complete the HEXACO personality survey (see Appendix D).  Since this is not feasible in a 
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large-scale empirical study, we turn to research from trait theorists on the ability of face-based 
judgments to predict trustworthiness and honesty. Research shows that inferences of 
trustworthiness occur within 38 seconds and are virtually unchanged as exposure increases 
(Baker et al. 2015).  The face, often referred to as the window to the soul, is used to 
communicate intentions and emotions and scrutinized by others during encounters (Porter et al. 
2008).  Facial appearance based on unchanging aspects of facial structure, as displayed in 
photos, is as successful as dynamic emotional expression in helping the observer form an 
impression of trustworthiness (Baker et al. 2015).  First impressions of trustworthiness are also 
shown to form the basis of judgments of honesty (Baker et al. 2015).   
Whether genetics can lead to both untrustworthy-looking faces and behavior has 
historically been more contentious (see Todorov and Porter 2014 for a discussion).  Non-verbal 
behavior, including gestures and facial expressions, can accurately convey a range of 
information, including values, opinions, physical states such as fatigue, cognitive states such as 
confusion or comprehension and emotions (Helfat and Peteraf 2015).  However, stereotypical 
responses to faces may shape the social environment, leading to self-fulfilling prophecy effects.  
For example, people with facial features that elicit attributes of agreeableness may be treated as 
more trustworthy and may perhaps consequently develop more agreeable personality 
characteristics (Slepian and Ames 2016). Chronic exposure to elevated levels of hormones, such 
as cortisol, growth hormone and estrogen is also shown to lead to changes in facial appearance 
that are correlated with behavioral dispositions (Jia et al. 2014).   Research by Porter et al. (2008) 
finds that initial judgments of trustworthy faces are more accurate than judgments of 
untrustworthy faces.   
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Taken together, the findings to date suggest that face-based judgments of perceived CFO 
and CEO honesty could be used as proxies for attitude/rationalization.  CFOs and CEOs 
perceived to be more honest should be less likely to manage earnings within GAAP to deceive 
investors. Hence, our first research hypothesis: 
H1: Visual cues for perceived CFO(CEO) honesty are negatively associated with the 
propensity to engage in earnings management.  
Personality research reveals that friends are somewhat similar in their levels of honesty and 
openness to experience, but not in their levels of emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness (Ashton, 2013).  In addition, the honesty and openness to experience 
personality factors are shown to underlie our choices regarding goals that are worth pursuing.  
Not surprisingly, many CEOs replace the CFO with someone of their own personal choice at the 
time of commencing employment at a new firm, perhaps as a result of divergences in opinion 
caused by differing levels of honesty and/or openness to experience.  We explore whether CFOs 
and CEOs who are both perceived to be more (less) honest based on visual and verbal cues 
engage in less (more) financial reporting misconduct.  This leads to our second research 
hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H2: The association between visual cues and earnings management is more pronounced 
when the CFO and CEO cues are consistent.   
3. Method 
Sample and data 
We obtain a list of companies included in the S&P 500 index for the years 2011, 2012 
and 2013.  Due to data availability issues for a number of CEOs and CFOs, our sample is 
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restricted to a total of 950 firm-year observations for which both CEO and CFO photos and 
sufficient conference call data is available.  We download photographs of all CEOs and CFOs 
from their respective company websites as well as from historical annual reports and Google 
Images when required. Perceived facial honesty is assessed using ratings obtained from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers, as detailed below. Earnings management proxies are calculated using 
Compustat data, executive compensation data is obtained from Execucomp, and internal control 
deficiency/audit fee data is obtained from Audit Analytics.   
Models  
Honesty and earnings management 
We use the following regression model to examine the association between visual cues 
for perceived honesty/humility and earnings management: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁302𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model (1) is estimated for both CFOs and CEOs independently. EM is one of two 
measures for accruals management and two measures for real earnings management. VISUAL, 
STOCKCOMP, BONUS and GENDER are CFO- and CEO-specific measures. CFOs and/or 
CEOs are expected to manage earnings if they have incentives and the opportunities to do so. 
STOCKCOMP, BONUS, LOSS and LEVERAGE are proxies for incentives to manage earnings 
while SECTION302 and PERCAUDITFEES measure opportunities to do so. If visual cues for 
perceived honesty are negatively associated with earnings management as predicted by H1, the 
coefficient for VISUAL will be negative and significant.  
  
(1) 
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Interaction between CFO and CEO  
We examine the association between perceived honesty and earnings management when 
the CFO and the CEO for a company are perceived to be more (less) honest.  First, we use the 
CFO and CEO visual scores relative to the median to classify sample firms into subgroups. We 
create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO visual score is below median and the CEO 
visual score is above or equal to median, and 0 otherwise (<MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN); an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the CFO visual score is above or equal to median and the CEO visual score 
is lower than median, and 0 otherwise (>=MEDIAN/<MEDIAN); and an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the CFO and CEO visual scores are both above or equal to median, and 0 otherwise 
(>=MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN).  
Hence, the following regression model: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = < 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 ⋰≥ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 𝑖,𝑡 + ≥ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 ⋰< 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ ≥ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁 ⋰≥ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁302𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+  𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
If the ability of cues to predict behaviour is more pronounced when CFO visual cues are 
consistent with CEO visual cues, the coefficient for >=MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN will be negative 
and significant.  
We then use the CFO and CEO visual scores relative to the 25
th
 percentile (bottom 
quartile) and 75
th
 percentile (top quartile) values to classify sample CFOs (CEOs) into different 
subgroups. We create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO and CEO visual scores are both 
in the top quartile, and 0 otherwise (TOPQ/TOPQ); an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO 
(2) 
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visual score is in the bottom three quartiles and the CEO visual score is in the top quartile, 0 
otherwise (BOTTOM3Q/TOPQ); and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO visual score is 
in the top quartile and the CEO visual score is in the bottom three quartiles, and 0 otherwise 
(TOPQ/BOTTOM3Q). We repeat the process and create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
CFO and CEO visual scores are both in the bottom quartile, and 0 otherwise 
(BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ); an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO visual score is in the top 
three quartiles and the CEO visual score is in the bottom quartile, 0 otherwise 
(TOP3Q/BOTTOMQ); and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO visual score is in the 
bottom quartile and the CEO visual score is in the top three quartiles, and 0 otherwise 
(BOTTOMQ/TOP3Q).   
Hence, the following regression models: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑄 ⋰ 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑄 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀3𝑄 ⋰ 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑄 ⋰ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀3𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁302𝑖,𝑡
+  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀𝑄 ⋰ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀𝑄 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑇𝑂𝑃3𝑄 ⋰ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑀𝑄 ⋰ 𝑇𝑂𝑃3𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁302𝑖,𝑡
+  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
If the ability of cues to predict behaviour is more pronounced when CFO visual cues are 
consistent with CEO visual cues as predicted by H2, the coefficient for TOPQ/TOPQ will be 
(3) 
(4) 
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negative and significant and the coefficient for BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ will be positive and 
significant. 
Variables 
Dependent variable - Earnings management 
We use unsigned (absolute) values for both discretionary and real earnings management 
measures in all of our analyses.  While firms typically engage in earnings management to inflate 
reported earnings, the possibility also exists for firms to use earnings management techniques to 
decrease reported earnings i.e. “big bath” accounting, income smoothing.  In addition, while 
firms can strategically time debits and credits, as well as real business activities, in the short-
term, accruals must reverse in future periods and a company must increase their levels of 
investment in the future to stay viable.  We expect more honest CFOs and CEOs to engage in 
less earnings management, whether income-increasing or income-decreasing.  
Accruals management – We use two models to measure accruals management. Given our 
focus on less egregious instances of earnings management, we first use the modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) matched by performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 
2005) to estimate normal accruals (see Appendix A for formula details). In all regressions, 
ABACC is used to denote this performance matched modified Jones model.  Second, we use the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to estimate normal working capital accruals (see Appendix A 
for formula details).   Throughout our analyses, DICHEV is used to denote the Dechow-Dichev 
model. 
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 Real earnings management - Consistent with prior research (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012), we examine three methods of manipulating real 
activities:  
1) Accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional unsustainable sales to 
increase reported earnings. If the CFO or CEO attempt to artificially inflate current year 
sales by offering discounts or more lenient credit terms, sales will increase without a 
corresponding increase in cash inflows from sales. Production costs relative to sales will 
also appear to be abnormally high.  Throughout our analyses, ABCFO is used to denote 
abnormal cash flows from operations. 
2) Reducing discretionary expenditures to increase reported earnings. If the CFO or CEO 
reduce spending on R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses, discretionary expenses will 
decrease without a corresponding decrease in sales.   In all regressions, ABEXP is used to 
denote abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
3) Overproducing or increasing production to report lower COGS and higher earnings. If the 
CFO or CEO produce more inventory than needed to meet demand, unit cost and COGS 
will decrease without a corresponding increase in sales.   Throughout our analyses, 
ABPROD is used to denote abnormal production costs.   
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we aggregate the three individual 
measures into two proxies. REM1 is the sum of ABEXP and ABPROD. REM2 is the sum of 
ABCFO and ABEXP. Higher values of REM1 and REM2 indicate more real activities 
manipulation.   
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Independent variables  
Measures of Perceived Honesty/Humility - Visual Cues 
Raw honesty scores are obtained from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that enables individuals and employers (known as 
Requesters) to coordinate the use of human intelligence to perform tasks. Employers post jobs 
known as HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks) and workers (called Providers or more colloquially 
Turkers) can then select jobs and complete tasks for a monetary payment set by the Employer. 
For each photo, MTurk workers rate the perceived honesty by answering a series of 10 questions, 
as detailed in Appendix B and adapted from the HEXACO-PI-R self-report form available at 
http://hexaco.org/hexaco-inventory (Lee and Ashton, 2018).  For each question, the worker 
selects one of five options as follows: 1 – strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – neutral; 4 – agree; 
and 5 – strongly agree. To ensure accuracy, only Turk workers with a HIT (i.e. job) approval 
rating greater than or equal to 95% and at least 100 approved HITs are used to rate the 
photographs.  
Each photo is rated, on average, 18 times by MTurk workers. The use of a composite 
rating is consistent with the work of Hamermesh and Parker (2005), who noted that the estimated 
coefficients are larger when based on evaluations of a composite measure rather than a single 
rater.  Composite measures are more reliable because they are based on aggregations of 
correlated responses. The actual number of ratings varies slightly from photo to photo because a 
random number generator is used to select photos for each rater.  
The raw quantitative scores for each CEO/CFO photo are then converted into a single 
perceived honesty measure. First, the mean of a rater’s 10 scores for a given photo is calculated, 
taking into consideration those six questions which are reverse coded (see Appendix B for 
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details).  The mean score is increasing in perceived honesty, with higher (lower) scores 
representing higher (lower) perceived honesty. Next, the scores for each rater are analyzed to 
assess those raters who are unreliable.
1
 The scores for the reliable raters are then used to 
calculate the mean honesty score for each CEO/CFO photo.  Finally, the variable is normalized 
(between 0 and 1) to facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients.
2
 We refer to this 
variable as the normalized perceived visual honesty score (VISUAL).   
All photographs are obtained from the Internet and in all cases, the facial expression is 
either smiling or neutral (little variation), thus unlikely to affect the empirical findings. A study 
by Morrison et al. (2013) shows identity to be 2.2 times as important as emotion (anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness, surprise) in rating attractiveness for male and female pictures. Since the 
hard tissues of the face are unchangeable, raters are able to make honesty judgments based on 
structural cues.  
Incentives to manage earnings 
Incentives to manage earnings exist when management is under pressure to achieve an 
earnings target and the consequences of missing the target are significant (e.g. CAS 240, CPA 
Canada, 2018). Examples of risk factors include significant portions of executive compensation, 
including bonuses and stock-based compensation, being contingent upon meeting set earnings 
targets; operating losses threatening the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern; and the 
need to obtain additional debt financing to stay competitive (CAS 240, CPA Canada, 2018).  
                                                          
1 To control for rating quality, we only include a rater’s scores in our sample if their ratings are of consistent quality.  
More specifically, we proxy for quality in two ways: (1) the standard deviation of mean scores for a given rater is at 
least 0.3; and (2) the average standard deviation of responses to the 10 honesty questions for a given rater is less 
than 1.1.  Both of these criteria must be met for the rater’s ratings to be removed from our analysis.  These cutoffs, 
though somewhat arbitrary, seem reasonable based on our review of the raw data.   
2
 Some researchers standardize the individual scores by subtracting the mean and dividing by the coder’s standard 
deviation.  We do not adopt this method because it could potentially reward “irresponsible” judges that 
predominantly assign the average rating and penalize those that followed instructions and used the entire scale. 
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We include four proxies to capture these incentives to manage earnings. STOCKCOMP is 
the ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation.  BONUS is the ratio of bonus-
based pay to total compensation. The relationship between executive compensation and earnings 
management is well-documented in the literature (e.g. Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; 
Balsam, 1998; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2003). We expect STOCKCOMP and BONUS to be 
positively associated with earnings management measures.  
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise. Prior 
research supports the existence of incentives to avoid losses (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Burgstahler and Eames, 2010). We expect LOSS to be positively 
associated with all earnings management measures. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. Prior studies suggest the potential for earnings management to avoid debt covenant 
violations increases with leverage (e.g. Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and 
Weber, 2003). Hence, we expect LEVERAGE to be positively associated with our earnings 
management measures.  
Opportunities to manage earnings 
Upper management members, including CFOs and CEOs, are in a unique position to 
manage earnings because they have the ability to override controls that appear to be operating 
effectively to manipulate accounting records. The risk of management override of controls is 
present in all entities, albeit at different levels (CAS 240, CPA Canada, 2018). We include two 
proxies for opportunities to manage earnings.  
SECTION302 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO and CEO report internal 
control deficiencies under SOX 302, and 0 otherwise. The CFO and CEO are required to attest to 
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their responsibility for accuracy and veracity of financial reports and disclose any deficiencies in 
internal control under SOX Section 302. Prior research shows increased levels of real earnings 
management and accruals management following the disclosure of internal control deficiencies 
(e.g. Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Chan et al. 2008). As such, we expect 
a positive association between SECTION302 and all earnings management measures.  
PERCAUDITFEES is the ratio of audit and audit-related fees to total fees. The ability for 
management to override controls is constrained by auditors, among others. Irrespective of the 
assessed risk of management override, auditors are required to perform procedures to test for the 
appropriateness of journal entries recorded in the general ledger at the end of a reporting period, 
review accounting estimates for biases, and evaluate the plausibility of the business rationale for 
significant transactions outside of the normal course of business (CAS 240, CPA Canada, 2018). 
We expect auditors to exercise better oversight as the ratio of audit and audit-related fees 
increase. If such is the case, PERCAUDITFEES will be negatively associated with all earnings 
management measures.  
Control variables 
We control for systematic variations in earnings management measures with size, growth 
opportunities, and profitability by including SIZE, MTB and ROA in all regression models. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is the ratio of the market value of common shares at 
the end of the reporting period to the book value of common shares. ROA is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to beginning of period total assets.  
We also include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO (CEO) is male, and 0 
otherwise (GENDER). Prior research suggests female CFOs and CEOs are less likely to engage 
22 
 
in earnings management (e.g. Liu et al. 2016; O’Neill et al. 2017). Hence, we expect GENDER 
to be positively associated with all earnings management measures.     
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models. 
77.76% (2.61%) of sample CFO and CEO compensation is equity-based (bonus-based) on 
average. This suggests strong incentives to manage earnings to protect equity-based 
compensation. Only 5.27% of sample firms reports losses. This is not surprising given our focus 
on S&P 500 firms, generally expected to be more profitable. 11.95% of sample firms disclose 
internal control deficiencies under SOX Section 302, supporting the existence of some 
opportunities for sample CFOs and CEOs to override controls to manage earnings. 87.95% of 
total audit fees are audit or audit-related on average. As such, we expect to see some evidence of 
auditor oversight acting as a constraint to real earnings and accruals management.  Mean values 
for SIZE (9.8102), MTB (1.8295), and ROA (0.0620) suggest sample firms are large and 
profitable on average, consistent with their inclusion in the S&P 500 Index.  
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between our variables of interest. CFO visual cues 
for perceived honesty are negatively and significantly correlated with most earnings management 
measures.  While the CEO visual cues are not significantly correlated with the earnings 
management measures, there is a significant positive correlation between CFO and CEO visual 
cues. Earnings management measures are highly correlated with one another. The high 
correlations between other measures support the existence of a concerted tendency to manage 
earnings both by managing earnings and manipulating real activities.  
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Table 3 explores potential interactions between visual and verbal cues for honesty (Panels 
A and B), as well as between CFO and CEO visual cues (Panel C) and CFO and CEO verbal 
cues (Panel D) with frequency tables. The relationship between the classification factors is tested 
with a Chi-2 test. The Chi-2 statistic is significant at the 1% level in all cases. Visual and verbal 
cues are therefore not independent classification factors, and each subgroup is significantly 
different from the others. This supports the existence of interaction effects between visual and 
verbal cues for honesty, and CFO and CEO matching based on visual or verbal scores,   
 Table 4 compares mean values for accruals management and real earnings management 
measures across subgroups of sample firms. Panels A and B partition the sample based on 25
th
 
percentile and 75
th
 percentile values for CFOVISUAL (Panel A) and CEOVISUAL (Panel B).  We 
test for differences between bottom quartile and top 3 quartiles; bottom 3 quartiles and top 
quartile; and bottom and top quartile. Panel C partitions the sample based on below/above 
median, 25
th
 percentile and 75
th
 percentiles values for combined CFO (CEO) visual scores.   
We expect mean values for the earnings management measures to be higher when visual 
cues for perceived honesty are lower, individually or in combination. Individually, statistical 
significance is observed consistently for the CFO, but rarely for the CEO.  When the CEO and 
CFO are analyzed in combination as noted in Panel C, statistical significance is observed 
consistently when comparing firms with the CEO/CFO in the top quartile with those firms where 
both the CEO/CFO are not in the top quartile.  
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Multivariate results  
Perceived honesty and earnings management 
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of accruals management and real earnings 
management measures on visual cues for perceived honesty, incentives, and opportunities. 
Results for CFOs are presented in Panel A and results for CEOs are presented in Panel B.  Each 
column reports the results from Model (1) when visual cues are included, consistent with H1. An 
incremental R
2
 is calculated by comparing the R
2
 from a regression of earnings management 
measures on incentives, opportunities and control variables to the R
2
 from a regression of 
earnings management measures on visual cues, incentives, opportunities and control variables. 
Coefficients for financial year indicator variables are not reported.  
Consistent with H1, the coefficient for CFOVISUAL is negative when ABACC, DICHEV, 
REM1 and REM2 are used as dependent variables, but not statistically significant for ABACC. 
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient for CEOVISUAL is not statistically significant in any of 
the regressions. Taken together, these results suggest a stronger association between visual cues 
for perceived CFO honesty and earnings management measures than visual cues for perceived 
CEO honesty and earnings management measures.  
Results for incentives, opportunities and control variables are largely similar for all 
models and generally consistent with expectations. The coefficients for CFOSTOCKCOMP and 
CEOSTOCKCOMP are positive and significant as predicted for most measures. The coefficients 
for BONUS are positive and significant in a few instances.  This suggests stock-based 
compensation is a stronger incentive to manage earnings for both CFOs and CEOs.  The 
coefficient for LOSS is positive and significant in most instances, indicating a strong incentive 
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for our sample firms to avoid reporting losses. The coefficient for SECTION302 is positive and 
significant for REM1 and REM2. Sample firms that disclose internal control deficiencies under 
SOX Section 302 therefore appear to engage in more earnings management, using real activities 
manipulation, consistent with CFOs and CEOs being more likely to override controls related to 
operational than financial reporting decisions that might be more scrutinized. The coefficient for 
PERCAFEES is significant in the predicted direction for ABACC, but positive and significant for 
TOTACCR. Auditors appear to have a stronger impact on accruals management than real 
activities manipulation, consistent with their focus on financial reporting decisions. The 
coefficients for all other control variables vary in significance and direction.  
Interaction between CFO and CEO 
Table 6 reports the OLS regression results of accruals management and real earnings 
management measures on CFOs and CEOs with matching levels of visual cues. The first column 
reports results for Model (2), the second column reports results for Model (3), and the third 
column reports results from Model (4). Subsample sizes for visual cues drawn from the full 
population are 537 for BOTTOM3Q/BOTTOM3Q; 174 for BOTTOM3Q/TOPQ; 175 for 
TOPQ/BOTTOM3Q; 64 for TOPQ/TOPQ; 547 for TOP3Q/TOP3Q; 165 for 
TOP3Q/BOTTOMQ; 164 for BOTTOMQ/TOP3Q; and 74 for BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ.  
Coefficients for financial year indicator variables are not reported.   
Looking at the first column of Panel A, the coefficient for >=MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN is 
negative and significant as predicted for DICHEV and REM2. The coefficient for 
>=MEDIAN/<MEDIAN is also negative and significant for DICHEV. The second column 
presents results relative to the reference subgroup of CFOs and CEOs where visual cues are both 
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in the bottom three quartiles (BOTTOM3Q/BOTTOM3Q).  The coefficients for TOPQ/TOPQ are 
negative and statistically significant for ABACC, DICHEV, REM1, and REM2. The coefficients 
for other subgroups are not significant. These findings seem to support lower levels of earnings 
management when visual cues for both the CFO and CEO are in the top quartile.  
The third column presents results relative to the reference subgroup of CFOs and CEOs 
where visual cues are both in the top three quartiles (TOP3Q/TOP3Q). The coefficients for 
BOTTOMQ/TOP3Q and BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ are positive and statistically significant in 
some instances. These results provide some support for higher levels of earnings management 
when visual cues for the CFO are in the bottom quartile. Taken together, results from Table 6 
suggest differences in levels of earnings management are more likely to be observed when both 
the CEO and CFO are in the top quartile or when the CFO is in the bottom quartile of perceived 
honesty.   
Robustness Checks  
Measures of Perceived Honesty/Humility – Verbal Cues 
Verbal communication is an important means by which executives communicate with 
stakeholders.  For example, Bandiera et al. (2017) find that 85% of CEO time is spent on 
activities that involve communication, including speeches, phone calls, conference calls and 
meetings.  A number of papers investigate the language of deceptive executives, providing 
evidence of differences in verbal discourse.  For example, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) find 
that deceptive executives exhibit more references to general knowledge, fewer non-extreme 
positive emotions, and fewer references to shareholder value.  The psychology literature also 
supports the role played by verbal cues in predicting deception. DePaulo et al. (1983) find that 
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liars provide both verbal and visual cues to their deception.  Interestingly, the lies of the highly 
motivated senders are less readily detected when only verbal cues are available but more readily 
detected in conditions that include both verbal and nonverbal cues.  Vrij (2000) and Vrij et al. 
(2004) show that more accurate truth/lie decisions can be made when both speech content and 
non-verbal behavior are taken into account together instead of individually.  Porter et al. (1995) 
and Porter et al. (1999) find that a combination of verbal and non-verbal cues assists in deception 
detection.  
In an effort to explore the incremental explanatory power of verbal cues, in addition to 
visual cues, we extract both CEOs’ and CFOs’ speeches from quarterly earnings conference call 
transcripts obtained from Thomson Reuters StreetEvents to measure verbal cues. Conference call 
transcripts have been extensively used in existing studies to capture how CEOs’ disclosure styles 
influence investors’ perceptions and judgments (Hobson et al. 2012; Kimbrough 2005; Larcker 
and Zakolyukina 2012).  Verbal cues for perceived honesty/humility are measured as the 
percentage of abstract words used by CEOs and CFOs during these quarterly earnings 
conference calls, using both the prepared and the question and answer portions of each 
conference call. We use the question and answer (Q&A) portion of the call, in addition to the 
prepared portion, as the Q&A portion provides us with insight into unedited attitudes and 
feelings about the topics directly from the speaker.   
For each CEO/CFO, we take the average of the scores from the four quarterly conference 
calls as the proxy for honesty/humility for each year. We use the list of “abstract” words 
included in the General Inquirer Harvard IV-4 dictionary.   The use of this specific list of abstract 
words is consistent with the findings from Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) who show that 
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deceptive CEOs and CFOs use more references to “general knowledge”.  It is also consistent 
with results from Pan et al. (2018), who find that corporate leaders’ use of “concrete” language is 
positively associated with investor reaction because concrete language can enhance the 
confidence investors have in them.  VERBAL is calculated as 1 – the normalized value of the 
score, such that higher positive values indicate more perceived honesty. 
The correlation between CFOVISUAL and CFOVERBAL is 5.91% while the correlation 
between CEOVISUAL and CEOVERBAL is 10.57%. These statistically significant but relatively 
small correlations indicate the two measures are likely to complement one another in measuring 
perceived honesty/humility. The correlation between CFOVERBAL and CEOVERBAL is 33.86% 
and significant at the 1% level. This relatively high correlation indicates some level of 
coordination between the CFO and CEO as they prepare to discuss and answer questions related 
to quarterly earnings.   
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results of accruals management and real earnings 
management measures on CFOs with matching levels of visual and verbal cues (Panel A) and 
CEOs with matching levels of visual and verbal cues (Panel B).  The first column reports results 
analogous to the method used in Model (2), the second column reports results analogous to the 
method used in Model (3), and the third column reports results analogous to the method used in 
Model (4).  
Looking at the first column of Panel A, the coefficient for >=MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN is 
negative and significant as predicted for DICHEV, REM1 and REM2. The coefficients for the 
other subgroups are not statistically significant.  This suggests both visual and verbal cues for 
perceived CFO honesty need to be higher than median to observe lower levels of earnings 
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management than the reference subgroup (<MEDIAN/<MEDIAN).  The second column presents 
results relative to the reference subgroup of CFOs where both visual and verbal cues are in the 
bottom three quartiles (BOTTOM3Q/BOTTOM3Q).  The coefficients for BOTTOM3Q/TOPQ 
and TOPQ/BOTTOM3Q are negative and mostly statistically significant for DICHEV, REM1, 
and REM2. However, the coefficient for TOPQ/TOPQ is never statistically significant. This 
seems to support lower levels of earnings management when either visual or verbal cues are in 
the top quartile. The lack of significance for TOPQ/TOPQ is likely due to the small sample size 
relative to the reference group.  
The third column presents results relative to the reference subgroup of CFOs where both 
visual and verbal cues are in the top three quartiles (TOP3Q/TOP3Q). The coefficients for 
BOTTOMQ/TOP3Q, TOP3Q/BOTTOMQ and BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ are positive and mostly 
statistically significant for DICHEV, REM1, and REM2. This seems to suggest higher levels of 
earnings management when either visual or verbal cues are in the bottom quartile.  
Results are weaker for CEOs (Panel B). The coefficient for >=MEDIAN/>=MEDIAN is 
negative as predicted for DICHEV, REM1 and REM2 and statistically significant for DICHEV 
and REM2. The coefficients for the other subgroups are mostly insignificant.  This suggests both 
visual and verbal cues for perceived CEO honesty need to be higher than median to observe 
lower levels of earnings management than the reference subgroup (<MEDIAN/<MEDIAN).  The 
second column presents results relative to the reference subgroup of CEOs where both visual and 
verbal cues are in the bottom three quartiles (BOTTOM3Q/BOTTOM3Q).  The coefficients for 
BOTTOM3Q/TOPQ and TOPQ/BOTTOM3Q are not statistically significant while the 
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coefficients for TOPQ/TOPQ are negative and significant in all instances. This seems to support 
lower levels of earnings management when both visual and verbal cues are in the top quartile.  
The third column presents results relative to the reference subgroup of CEOs where both 
visual and verbal cues are in the top three quartiles (TOP3Q/TOP3Q). The coefficients for 
TOP3Q/BOTTOMQ and BOTTOMQ/BOTTOMQ are positive and statistically significant in 
some instances, providing limited evidence of higher levels of earnings management when either 
visual or verbal cues are in the bottom quartile.  
Taken together, results from Panels A and B suggest visual and verbal cues for perceived 
CFO and CEO honesty seem to act as complements in explaining financial reporting quality, 
consistent with prior literature that shows that looking at a combination of verbal and non-verbal 
cues assist in detecting deception (e.g. Porter et al. 1995; Porter et al. 2001). 
Earnings Response Coefficients 
A long line of literature in accounting looks at the determinants of market reaction to 
unexpected accounting earnings.  Earnings persistence, earnings quality, growth opportunities 
and similar investor expectations are associated positively with earnings response coefficients 
while beta and leverage show a negative association. In the context of perceived honesty and 
humility, we conjecture that the market will react more strongly to earnings from those firms 
managed by CEOs and CFOs with higher perceived honesty.  This conjecture is consistent with 
our findings that more honest CEOs and CFOs engage in less earnings management than their 
less honest counterparts; hence, these more credible earnings results will likely correspond to a 
stronger stock market response.  Consistent with prior literature, we explore the relationship 
between stock market response and unexpected earnings by regressing cumulative abnormal 
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returns (CAR) on standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) with the regression coefficient on 
SUE interpreted as the earnings response coefficient.  CAR is calculated as the abnormal stock 
returns (raw returns less expected returns using the CAPM model) for the period one day prior to 
one day subsequent to the earnings release (-1,+1).  SUE is calculated as the difference between 
the actual earnings and median analyst forecasts, divided by the standard deviation of unexpected 
earnings using median analyst forecasts over the past eight quarters.   
Table 8 presents the regression results, where perceived honesty/humility is partitioned 
above/below median.  SUE*<MEDIAN represents the average impact of SUE for those 
observations where perceived honesty/humility is below median.  SUE*>=MEDIAN represents 
the average impact of SUE for those observations where perceived honesty/humility is above or 
equal to median.  The market reaction to unexpected earnings is stronger for almost all analyses 
when perceived honesty/humility is above or equal to median; including CFO visual, CFO 
verbal, CEO verbal, CFO visual/verbal, CEO visual/verbal, CFO/CEO visual and CFO/CEO 
verbal.  The only exception is for CEO visual, where the market response is stronger for CEOs 
perceived to be less honest.   
Signed versus Unsigned Earnings Management Measures 
We use unsigned (absolute) values for both discretionary and real earnings management 
measures in our main analyses.  As a robustness test, we rerun all regressions using signed values 
for all accruals and real earnings management measures. On balance, we expect that CEOs and 
CFOs perceived to be less honest will engage in both accruals and real earnings management 
activities that increase reported net income. Our results are broadly consistent with expectations.  
More specifically, for the CFO, earnings management is decreasing in perceived 
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honesty/humility (both visually and verbally).  For the CEO, earnings management is decreasing 
in perceived honesty/humility (verbally but not visually).  Turning to visual/verbal interaction, 
the negative relationship between perceived honesty/humility and earnings management is more 
pronounced when the visual and verbal cues are consistent (i.e. both strong or both weak).  These 
findings are consistent for both the CEO and CFO subsets. Finally, looking at CEO/CFO 
interaction, there is a stronger negative relationship between perceived honesty/humility and 
earnings management when the CEO and CFO are similar with respect to perceived 
honesty/humility.   
 Residuals as Dependent Variables 
 A recent paper by Chen et al. (2018) explores a potential bias when researchers use OLS 
to decompose a dependent variable into its predicted and residual components and use the 
residuals as the dependent variable in the second regression.  More specifically, the authors find 
that the standard implementation of this procedure results in biased coefficients and standard 
errors that can lead to incorrect inferences.   
 We use residuals as the dependent variable in the majority of our regressions, including 
the performance-matched modified Jones model, the Dechow-Dichev model, abnormal cash 
flows, abnormal expenses and abnormal production expenses.  As such, our results are 
potentially sensitive to this critique.  We re-run all of our models, regressing the residual from 
the first-step regression on the combination of all second-stage and first-stage regressors.  This is 
consistent with Chen at al. (2018), who state that this alternative two-step procedure generates 
unbiased estimates of the coefficient of interest, identical to those obtained from a single step 
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procedure.  Results (untabulated) for all accrual and real earnings management measures remain 
unchanged.  
Perceived Honesty/Humility Validity Check 
The observed link between visual perceptions of honesty and proclivity for earnings 
management is potentially contentious.  We cannot get sample CEOs and CFOs to complete the 
personality survey (noted in Appendix C) and compare these scores with the scores obtained 
from MTurk workers completing the same survey from an observer perspective by looking at the 
CEO/CFO photo (noted in Appendix B).  Therefore, in an effort to further validate our measure 
of perceived visual honesty, we ask a sample of colleagues, friends, and family members to 
complete the personality test (noted in Appendix C) as well as provide a personal photo.  Our 
final sample consists of 89 individuals who are willing to both provide a photo as well as 
complete the self-assessment.   
We use MTurk workers to rate the perceived honesty of each photo by answering the 10 
questions noted in Appendix B.  On average, each photo is rated by 35 individuals, with the 
average score taken as the proxy for perceived honesty.  Next, the photo score is compared with 
the self-assessment score for each colleague/friend/family member.  The correlation between 
third-party perception and personal self-assessment is statistically significant at +0.35.  In 
psychology/sociology research, correlations of between about -0.20 and +0.20 are considered 
small, correlations between -0.20 and -0.40 and between 0.20 and 0.40 are considered moderate 
in size, and correlations beyond -0.40 or beyond +0.40 are considered large (Ashton, 2013).  As 
such, the observed correlation of +0.35 provides support for our assertion that perceived honesty 
is a meaningful and validated proxy. 
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Linkage with Big 5 Personality Traits 
 Plöckinger et al. (2016) suggest that future accounting research use the Big Five 
personality traits to explore the relationship between financial reporting choices and managerial 
idiosyncrasies.  Consistent with a working paper by Hrazdil et al. (2018), we use reverse coding 
and compute a risk tolerance index based on the sum of the Big 5 personality traits as follows: 
openness to experience + (100 – conscientiousness) + extraversion + (100 – agreeableness) + 
(100 – emotionality) / 5.  Each of the Big 5 personality traits is calculated in a similar manner to 
that noted above for honesty/humility; the only difference being that for each Big 5 personality 
dimension, there is a series of 10 distinct questions which are adapted from the HEXACO-PI-R 
self-report form available at http://hexaco.org/hexaco-inventory (Lee and Ashton, 2018). 
 The Pearson correlation between the risk-taking and honesty/humility measures is -0.22 
for CFOs and -0.23 for CEOs.  This negative correlation is consistent with expectations; namely, 
more honest individuals take less aggressive actions.  We re-run all regressions from Table 5, 
using this new risk-taking measure in place of the current visual cue for perceived honesty. The 
risk-taking measure for CFOs is only positive and significant for DICHEV while it is only 
positive and significant for ABACC for CEOs.  Including both the risk-taking and perceived 
honesty measures in the regressions from Table 5 does not alter the sign or the significance of 
the results.  Overall, this suggests the Big 5 personality dimensions have a minimal ability to 
help explain the propensity for a CEO and/or CFO to engage in accrual-based or real earnings 
management. 
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Alternative Verbal Proxies 
 There has been a plethora of research on textual analysis in the past 20 years.  Some of 
the pioneers in the field, in laboratory settings, find that liars: (1) use more negative emotion 
words, revealing feelings of guilt; (2) use more tentative words, avoiding commitment to the lie; 
(3) use fewer exclusive words, in an effort to avoid verbal complexity; and (3) use fewer first-
person pronouns, in an effort to avoid accepting responsibility (Newman et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 
2004).   
 In an effort to supplement the use of “abstract” words as a proxy for verbal 
honesty/humility, we use other word dictionaries from Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC) program, developed by Pennebaker et al. (2001).  These word dictionaries include: (a) 
negative emotions- which we denote as NEGEMO; (b) tentative words – which we denote as 
TENTAT; (c) exclusive words – which we denote as EXCL; and (d) first-person pronouns – 
which we denote as MI.  The word genomes for each of these dictionaries, while not listed here, 
are provided to one of the authors by Pennebaker.  We re-run our analyses from Table 5 using 
each of NEGEMO, TENTAT, EXCL, and MI independently, as well as all together with VERBAL.   
Findings are broadly consistent with expectations.  Increased levels of TENTAT are 
associated with higher levels of earnings management while increased levels of EXCL are 
associated with lower levels of earnings management.  Increased levels of NEGEMO are 
associated with lower levels of earnings management while increased levels of MI are associated 
with higher levels of earnings management.  When all four word dictionaries, in addition to 
VERBAL, are included simultaneously in the models, VERBAL, NEGEMO and MI are 
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consistently statistically significant. TENTAT and EXCL are statistically significant in a smaller 
subset of regression analyses.   
5. Conclusion 
 
Using human rater scores to proxy for the perceived honesty of CEOs and CFOs at some 
of the largest public companies in America, and controlling for considerations such as incentives, 
opportunities, and a range of control variables, we find that facial cues have significant power in 
explaining a company’s propensity to engage in both real and accrual-based earnings 
management.  These observed honesty cues are incrementally informative to that provided by 
textual analysis of quarterly earnings conference calls.   
Our findings are broadly consistent with those from a number of recent studies; namely, 
that both the CEO and the CFO influence important firm outcomes i.e. financial performance, 
fraud, investment decisions, etc. However, we make a number of important contributions to the 
literature. 
First, and most importantly, we show that visual cues are important determinants of a 
firm’s propensity to engage in earnings management.  While other studies have looked at verbal 
cues, there is only one other working paper to date (Choudhury et al. 2018), to our knowledge, 
who has explored both dimensions simultaneously.  With a simple and clean setting, we show 
that verbal and visual cues are complementary in revealing a person’s honesty and in so doing, a 
firm’s earnings management practices.      As visual cues are easy to obtain i.e. CEO and CFO 
faces are readily available on the Internet, they provide a quick and efficient way for 
shareholders and other stakeholders to assess the quality of a firm’s management team.   
Second, through the validation of our visual proxies using a sample of colleagues, 
friends, and family members, we are able to support our assertion that facial honesty scores are 
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rooted in an individual’s  personality.  These findings lend support to only a handful of studies to 
date which have explored the informativeness of facial cues.   
Third, through the use of both accrual based and real earnings management proxies, we 
are able to address the recent call in the accounting literature to explore the characteristics of 
those firms which may commit fraud or financial reporting misconduct without detection.   
Lastly, we perform a number of additional analyses to ensure that our results are robust to 
a number of alternative model specifications.  More specifically, we show that: (1) 
honesty/humility is distinct from the Big 5 personality traits; (2) our results are robust to a 
number of verbal proxies for honesty/humility; and (3) our results generalize to signed earnings 
management measures in addition to unsigned earnings management proxies. 
Future research could examine whether the relationship between visual honesty cues and 
earnings management apply in a similar way to senior management teams in other countries.  
Another interesting extension would be to focus on private companies in those countries where 
financial statements are readily available.  Without the incentive to engage in earnings 
management due to the absence of income and share price targets, it would be interesting to see 
whether perceived honesty has any impact on financial statement recognition/measurement 
practices.   
Given recent advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence, it would be 
interesting to see how and whether more sophisticated tools (i.e. supervised/unsupervised 
learning) provide insights over and beyond those obtained through more traditional methods.    
Given the plethora of previous research studies on textual analysis and the emerging research on 
facial appearance, it is safe to say there are more interesting topics yet to be explored. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
ABACC Absolute value of the estimated residuals from the following industry-year 
regression (with at least 15 observations) using the Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) equations; 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +
𝛽1(∆𝑆𝑡−∆𝐴𝑅𝑡)
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +
𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
where TotalAccruals equals net income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows, ΔS is change in sales revenue, ΔAR is change in 
accounts receivables, PPE is net property, plant and equipment, ROA is return 
on assets, and Assetst-1 are lagged total assets.  Higher values indicate more 
accruals management (lower quality earnings).    
DICHEV Absolute value of the estimated residuals from the following industry-year 
regression (with at least 15 observations) using the Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
equation; 
𝑊𝐶 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1+𝜀𝑡 
where WC is working capital accruals; and CFOt-1, CFOt, and CFOt+1 are past, 
current, and future cash flows from operations, respectively.  Higher values 
indicate more accruals management (lower quality earnings). 
ABCFO Absolute value of the estimated residuals from the following industry-year 
regression (with at least 15 observations) using the Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Zang (2012) equation; 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛼2(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡 
where CFOt, is cash flows from operations, A is total assets and S is net sales.  
Higher values indicate greater amounts of sales manipulation to manage 
reported earnings. 
ABEXP Absolute value of the estimated residuals from the following industry-year 
regression (with at least 15 observations) using the Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Zang (2012) equation; 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛼2(
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡 
where DISX is the sum of advertising, research and development and SGA 
expenses (XAD + XRD + XSGA), A is total assets, and S is sales. Higher 
values indicate greater fluctuations in discretionary expenses to manage 
reported earnings.   
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
 
ABPROD Absolute value of the estimated residuals from the following industry-year 
regression (with at least 15 observations) using the Roychodhury (2006) and 
Zang (2012) equation; 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0+𝛼1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
)+𝛼2(
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3(
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼4(
∆𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜖𝑡 
where PROD is cost of goods plus change in inventory, A is total assets, S is 
sales, ΔS is change in sales revenue. Higher vales indicate higher amounts of 
under- or overproduction to manage COGS and reported earnings.   
REM1 ABEXP + ABPROD 
REM2 ABCFO + ABEXP 
CFOVISUAL Normalized mean honesty score (between 0 and 1) for each CEO picture 
calculated from reliable raters’ scores. 
CEOVISUAL Normalized mean honesty score (between 0 and 1) for each CEO picture 
calculated from reliable raters’ scores. 
CFOVERBAL 1 – the normalized average percentage of abstract words used by CFO during 
the four quarterly earnings conference calls for each year, using both the 
prepared and the question and answer portions of each conference call. 
CEOVERBAL 1 – the normalized average percentage of abstract words used by CEO during 
the four quarterly earnings conference calls for each year, using both the 
prepared and the question and answer portions of each conference call. 
CFOSTCKCOMP Ratio of CFO equity-based pay to total annual compensation. 
CFOBONUS Ratio of CFO bonus-based pay to total annual compensation. 
CEOSTCKCOMP Ratio of CEO equity-based pay to total annual compensation. 
CEOBONUS Ratio of CEO bonus-based pay to total annual compensation. 
AVERBONUS Simple average of CEOBONUS and CFOBONUS. 
AVERSTCKCOMP Simple average of CEOSTCKCOMP and CFOSTCKCOMP. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt (DLC + DLTT) to total assets (AT).  
SECTION302 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reports internal control 
deficiencies under SOX Section 302, and 0 otherwise.  
PERCAUDITFEES Ratio of audit and audit-related fees to total fees. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
MTB Ratio of the market value of common shares at the end of the fiscal year 
(PRCC_F*CHSO) to the book value of common shares (CEQ). 
ROA Ratio of income before extraordinary items (IB) to beginning of period total 
assets (AT). 
CFOGENDER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is a male, and 0 otherwise. 
CEOGENDER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is a male, and 0 otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B 
Honesty/Humility Observer Report Form 
 
Question # Question 
  
1 
 
 
He/she wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if 
he/she thought it would succeed.  
2 
 
If he/she knew that he/she could never get caught, he/she would be willing 
to steal a million dollars. (reverse coded) 
  
3 Having a lot of money is not especially important to him/her. 
  
4 
He/she thinks that he/she is entitled to more respect than the average 
person is.  (reverse coded) 
  
5 If he/she wants something from someone, he/she will laugh at that 
person’s worst jokes.  (reverse coded) 
 
6 
 
He/she would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.  
7 
 
He/she would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
(reverse coded) 
  
8 
He/she wants people to know that he/she is an important person of high 
status.  (reverse coded) 
  
9 
 
 
He/she wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do 
favours for him/her.  
10 
 
 
He/she’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if he/she were sure he/she 
could get away with it. (reverse coded) 
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APPENDIX C 
Honesty/Humility Self Report Form 
 
 
Question # Question 
  
1 
 
 
I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I 
thought it would succeed.  
2 
 
If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a 
million dollars. (reverse coded) 
  
3 Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
  
4 
I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.  
(reverse coded) 
  
5 If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst 
jokes.  (reverse coded) 
 
6 
 
I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.  
7 
 
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
(reverse coded) 
  
8 
I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.  
(reverse coded) 
  
9 
 
 
I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favours for 
me.  
10 
 
 
I would be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get 
away with it. (reverse coded) 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
ABACC 881 0.0978 0.0555 0.0004 0.5679 0.1097 
DICHEV 911 0.0808 0.0398 0.0003 0.5034 0.0969 
REM1 867 0.3833 0.2989 0.0012 1.6749 0.3414 
REM2 887 0.4193 0.2879 0.0028 2.1774 0.4237 
CFOVISUAL 950 0.4930 0.4963 0.0000 1.0000 0.1941 
CFOVERBAL 950 0.5474 0.5571 0.0000 1.0000 0.2072 
CEOVISUAL 950 0.4723 0.4712 0.0000 1.0000 0.2208 
CEOVERBAL 950 0.5481 0.5676 0.0000 1.0000 0.2119 
CFOSTCKCOMP 947 0.7396 0.7663 0.0000 0.9909 0.1314 
CFOBONUS 946 0.0296 0.0000 0.0000 0.7875 0.0893 
CEOSTCKCOMP 948 0.8159 0.8489 0.0000 0.9865 0.1324 
CEOBONUS 949 0.0227 0.0000 0.0000 0.4957 0.0752 
AVERSTCKCOMP 946 0.7776 0.8056 0.0000 0.9826 0.1181 
AVERBONUS 946 0.0261 0.0000 0.0000 0.5307 0.0766 
LOSS 949 0.0527 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2235 
LEVERAGE 913 0.2459 0.2209 0.0000 0.8920 0.1604 
SECTION302 845 0.1195 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3246 
PERCAUDITFEES 853 0.8795 0.9122 0.0909 1.0000 0.1196 
SIZE 918 9.8102 9.6535 7.1695 12.5561 1.2341 
MTB 918 1.8295 1.5309 0.7931 8.4102 0.9799 
ROA 918 0.0620 0.0534 -0.2958 0.3343 0.0562 
CFOGENDER 950 0.8874 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3163 
CEOGENDER 948 0.9641 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.1861 
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TABLE 2  
Correlations  
 
This table reports pairwise correlations between variables of interest. p-values are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 CFOVISUAL CEOVISUAL ABACC DICHEV REM1 REM2 
CFOVISUAL 
  
1.0000      
CEOVISUAL 0.0771** 
(0.018) 
1.0000     
ABACC -0.0552 
(0.101) 
-0.0052 
(0.878) 
1.0000    
DICHEV -0.0897*** 
(0.007) 
0.0135 
(0.684) 
0.3539*** 
(0.000) 
1.0000   
REM1 -0.0779** 
(0.021) 
-0.0087 
(0.798) 
0.5619*** 
(0.000) 
0.5021*** 
(0.000) 
1.0000  
REM2 -0.0820** 
(0.015) 
0.0129 
(0.702) 
0.5724*** 
(0.000) 
0.5560*** 
(0.000) 
0.9386*** 
(0.000) 
1.0000 
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TABLE 3 
Frequency Tables 
 
This table presents frequency tables for CFO visual and verbal cues (Panel A); CEO visual and 
verbal cues (Panel B); CFO and CEO visual cues (Panel C) and CFO and CEO verbal cues 
(Panel D). Variables are defined in Appendix A. The relationship between the visual and verbal 
classification factors is tested with a Chi-2 test.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: CFO VISUAL/VERBAL  
CFOVISUAL 
CFOVERBAL  
<MEDIAN >=MEDIAN TOTAL 
<MEDIAN   260 215 475 
>=MEDIAN 214 261 475 
TOTAL 474 476 950 
PEARSON CHI-2 8.9095*** 
Panel B: CEO VISUAL/VERBAL  
CEOVISUAL 
CEOVERBAL  
< MEDIAN >= MEDIAN TOTAL 
<MEDIAN 250 224 474 
>=MEDIAN 224 252 476 
TOTAL 474 476 950 
PEARSON CHI-2 3.0690* 
Panel C: CFO/CEO VISUAL 
CFOVISUAL 
CEOVISUAL  
<MEDIAN >=MEDIAN TOTAL 
<MEDIAN 263 212 475 
>=MEDIAN 211 264 475 
TOTAL 474 476 950 
PEARSON CHI-2 11.3853*** 
Panel D: CFO/CEO VERBAL  
CFOVERBAL 
CEOVERBAL  
<MEDIAN >=MEDIAN TOTAL 
<MEDIAN 285 189 474 
>=MEDIAN 189 287 476 
TOTAL 474 476 950 
PEARSON CHI-2 39.6155*** 
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TABLE 4  
Differences in Means 
 
This table compares mean values for real earnings management and accruals management measures across subgroups of sample firms. 
Panels A and B compare mean values for subgroups based on the values of the visual cues for CFOs and CEOs respectively. Panel C 
compares mean values for subgroups of CFOs and CEOs with matching levels of visual cues. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Results are based on one-tailed t-tests of differences in means. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CFOVISUAL 
  Bottom 
quartile 
(BQ) 
Bottom 3 
quartiles 
(B3Q) 
Top 3 quartiles 
(T3Q) 
Top quartile 
(TQ) 
Diff. 
(BQ – T3Q) 
Diff.  
(B3Q – TQ) 
Diff.  
(BQ – TQ) 
ABACC + 0.0973 0.1021 0.0980 0.0856 -0.0007 0.0165
**
 0.0117 
DICHEV + 0.0942 0.0859 0.0765 0.0655 0.0177
***
 0.0204
***
 0.0287
***
 
REM1 + 0.4151 0.4006 0.3740 0.3314 0.0411
*
 0.0692
***
 0.0837
***
 
REM2 + 0.4626 0.4394 0.4066 0.3604 0.0560
*
 0.0789
***
 0.1022
***
 
 
 
Panel B: CEOVISUAL 
  Bottom 
quartile 
(BQ) 
Bottom 3 
quartiles 
(B3Q) 
Top 3 quartiles 
(T3Q) 
Top quartile 
(TQ) 
Diff. 
(BQ – T3Q) 
Diff.  
(B3Q – TQ) 
Diff.  
(BQ – TQ) 
ABACC + 0.0994 0.0986 0.0973 0.0956 0.0020 0.0030 0.0038 
DICHEV + 0.0908 0.0802 0.0773 0.0824 0.0136
**
 -0.0021 0.0085 
REM1 + 0.4018 0.3865 0.3769 0.3735 0.0249 0.0130 0.0283 
REM2 + 0.4217 0.4210 0.4184 0.4139 0.0033 0.0071 0.0078 
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TABLE 4 - continued 
Differences in Means 
 
This table compares mean values for real earnings management and accruals management measures across subgroups of sample firms. 
Panels A and B compare mean values for subgroups based on the values of the visual cues for CFOs and CEOs respectively. Panel C 
compares mean values for subgroups of CFOs and CEOs with matching levels of visual cues. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Results are based on one-tailed t-tests of differences in means. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel C: CFO/CEO VISUAL MATCHING 
  MEDIAN QUARTILES 
  Lower 
Lower 
Higher 
Higher 
Diff. BQ/BQ = 
1 
BQ/BQ  
= 0 
Diff. TQ/TQ  
= 0 
TQ/TQ  
= 1 
Diff. 
ABACC + 0.0961 0.0959 0.0002 0.0946 0.0981 -0.0035 0.0988 0.0817 0.0171 
DICHEV + 0.0867 0.0788 0.0079 0.1042 0.0788 0.0254
**
 0.0818 0.0615 0.0203
*
 
REM1 + 0.3589 0.3563 0.0026 0.4100 0.3812 0.0288 0.3892 0.2807 0.1084
**
 
REM2 + 0.3940 0.3803 0.0137 0.4208 0.3998 0.0210 0.4270 0.2843 0.1427
**
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TABLE 5 
Visual Cues for Perceived Honesty and Earnings Management  
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on visual cues. 
Results for CFOs are presented in Panel A and results for CEOs are presented in Panel B. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Incremental R-squared represents the increase in 
explanatory power compared with a baseline model not including CFO (CEO) visual. 
 
Panel A: CFO 
VARIABLE H1 
ABACC DICHEV REM1 REM2 
 ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
CFO 
VISUAL 
-0.030 
(0.104) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.166
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.222
***
 
(0.004) 
 INCENTIVES 
CFOSTOCK 
COMP 
0.069
**
 
(0.022) 
0.051 
(0.110) 
0.248
***
 
(0.008) 
0.294
***
 
(0.009) 
CFOBONUS 0.114
**
 
(0.032) 
0.043 
(0.351) 
-0.041 
(0.719) 
0.017 
(0.911) 
LOSS -0.001 
(0.944) 
0.055
***
 
(0.001) 
0.075 
(0.127) 
0.099
*
 
(0.072) 
LEVERAGE 0.061
**
 
(0.023) 
0.028 
(0.205) 
-0.097 
(0.143) 
-0.003 
(0.972) 
 OPPORTUNITIES 
SECTION 
302 
0.012 
(0.290) 
0.017 
(0.157) 
0.123
***
 
(0.002) 
0.126
**
 
(0.014) 
PERCAUDITFEES -0.076
**
 
(0.028) 
-0.013 
(0.624) 
-0.119 
(0.248) 
-0.137 
(0.311) 
 CONTROL 
SIZE 0.002 
(0.460) 
0.004 
(0.305) 
-0.006 
(0.601) 
-0.007 
(0.624) 
MTB 0.023
***
 
(0.001) 
0.017
***
 
(0.005) 
0.059
***
 
(0.009) 
0.046
*
 
(0.098) 
ROA 0.122 
(0.256) 
0.427
***
 
(0.000) 
1.437
***
 
(0.000) 
2.123
***
 
(0.000) 
CFO 
GENDER 
0.002 
(0.841) 
0.010 
(0.340) 
0.039 
(0.233) 
0.020 
(0.625) 
Observations 803 800 764 783 
R-squared 8.9% 12.4% 17.4% 16.0% 
Incremental R-squared 0.28% 0.89% 0.79% 0.94% 
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TABLE 5 – continued 
Visual Cues for Perceived Honesty and Earnings Management  
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on visual cues. 
Results for CFOs are presented in Panel A and results for CEOs are presented in Panel B. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Incremental R-squared represents the increase in 
explanatory power compared with a baseline model not including CFO (CEO) visual. 
 
 
Panel B: CEO 
VARIABLE H1 
ABACC DICHEV REM1 REM2 
 ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
CEO 
VISUAL 
-0.024 
(0.125) 
0.002 
(0.896) 
-0.068 
(0.179) 
-0.055 
(0.365) 
 INCENTIVES 
CEOSTOCK 
COMP 
0.049** 
(0.031) 
0.006 
(0.830) 
0.112 
(0.134) 
0.186** 
(0.027) 
CEOBONUS 0.140** 
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.775) 
-0.148 
(0.263) 
-0.095 
(0.558) 
LOSS 0.000 
(0.999) 
0.053*** 
(0.001) 
0.068 
(0.142) 
0.102* 
(0.062) 
LEVERAGE 0.049* 
(0.067) 
0.024 
(0.288) 
-0.120* 
(0.062) 
-0.030 
(0.714) 
 OPPORTUNITIES 
SECTION 
302 
0.010 
(0.353) 
0.014 
(0.220) 
0.116*** 
(0.004) 
0.119** 
(0.022) 
PERCAUDITFEES -0.087** 
(0.012) 
-0.025 
(0.331) 
-0.191* 
(0.059) 
-0.212 
(0.110) 
 CONTROL 
SIZE 0.003 
(0.415) 
0.005 
(0.158) 
-0.002 
(0.869) 
-0.002 
(0.889) 
MTB 0.022*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.008) 
0.057** 
(0.012) 
0.042 
(0.128) 
ROA 0.131 
(0.223) 
0.445*** 
(0.000) 
1.550*** 
(0.000) 
2.266*** 
(0.000) 
CEO 
GENDER 
-0.072*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026 
(0.154) 
-0.238*** 
(0.003) 
-0.244** 
(0.019) 
Observations 773 802 766 785 
R-squared 10.1% 11.3% 17.8% 15.9% 
Incremental R-squared 0.23% 0.00% 0.20% 0.08% 
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TABLE 6 
Interaction between CFO and CEO Visual Cues 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on CFOs and CEOs with 
matching levels of visual cues. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
VARIABLE H2 
ABACC DICHEV 
ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
BASELINE: <MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CEO 
TOP 3Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
<MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CEO 
TOP 3Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
<MEDIAN CFO 
>=MEDIAN CEO 
-0.006 
(0.601) 
  -0.007 
(0.476) 
  
>=MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
0.006 
(0.618) 
  -0.016* 
(0.077) 
  
>=MEDIAN CFO 
>=MEDIAN CEO 
-0.007 
(0.500) 
  -0.017* 
(0.068) 
  
BOTTOM 3Q CFO 
TOP Q CEO 
 -0.017* 
(0.089) 
  -0.001 
(0.929) 
 
TOP Q CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q CEO 
 -0.004 
(0.713) 
  -0.013 
(0.103) 
 
TOP Q CFO 
TOP Q CEO 
 -0.030** 
(0.031) 
  -0.034*** 
(0.001) 
 
TOP 3Q CFO 
BOTTOM Q CEO 
  0.008 
(0.462) 
  0.008 
(0.369) 
BOTTOM Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
  0.013 
(0.258) 
  0.027*** 
(0.008) 
BOTTOM Q CFO 
BOTTOM Q CEO 
  0.006 
(0.658) 
  0.030** 
(0.033) 
INCENTIVES 
AVERSTKCOMP 0.076** 
(0.012) 
0.076** 
(0.012) 
0.077** 
(0.011) 
0.040 
(0.249) 
0.035 
(0.315) 
0.045 
(0.196) 
AVERBONUS 0.165*** 
(0.009) 
0.167*** 
(0.008) 
0.158** 
(0.013) 
0.028 
(0.603) 
0.030 
(0.586) 
0.027 
(0.617) 
LOSS 0.002 
(0.897) 
-0.000 
(0.982) 
0.001 
(0.953) 
0.057*** 
(0.001) 
0.054*** 
(0.001) 
0.055*** 
(0.001) 
LEVERAGE 0.053* 
(0.050) 
0.050* 
(0.060) 
0.056** 
(0.040) 
0.021 
(0.343) 
0.023 
(0.298) 
 
0.030 
(0.171) 
OPPORTUNITIES 
SECTION 
302 
0.011 
(0.346) 
0.010 
(0.373) 
0.011 
(0.321) 
0.017 
(0.156) 
0.014 
(0.236) 
0.017 
(0.147) 
PERCAUDITFEES -0.087** 
(0.012) 
-0.078** 
(0.031) 
-0.084** 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.406) 
-0.015 
(0.588) 
-0.020 
(0.449) 
CONTROL 
SIZE 0.002 
(0.496) 
0.002 
(0.529) 
0.002 
(0.450) 
0.004 
(0.262) 
0.004 
(0.245) 
0.005 
(0.186) 
MTB 0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.023*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.008) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
ROA 0.135 
(0.212) 
0.131 
(0.228) 
0.132 
(0.219) 
0.441*** 
(0.000) 
0.432*** 
(0.000) 
0.439*** 
(0.000) 
CFO GENDER 0.009 
(0.413) 
0.007 
(0.517) 
0.007 
(0.543) 
0.013 
(0.226) 
0.012 
(0.279) 
0.013 
(0.204) 
CEO GENDER -0.070*** 
(0.006) 
-0.070*** 
(0.006) 
-0.069*** 
(0.007) 
-0.029 
(0.121) 
-0.026 
(0.172) 
-0.026 
(0.145) 
Observations 770 770 770 799 799 799 
R-squared 10.3% 10.7% 10.3% 12.1% 12.4% 12.9% 
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TABLE 6 – continued 
Interaction between CFO and CEO Visual Cues 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on CFOs and CEOs with 
matching levels of visual cues. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
VARIABLE H2 
REM1 REM2 
ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
BASELINE: <MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CEO 
TOP 3Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
<MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q 
CEO 
TOP 3Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
<MEDIAN CFO 
>=MEDIAN CEO 
0.037 
(0.303) 
  0.041 
(0.363) 
 
  
>=MEDIAN CFO 
<MEDIAN CEO 
0.023 
(0.517) 
  0.024 
(0.583) 
  
>=MEDIAN CFO 
>=MEDIAN CEO 
-0.043 
(0.134) 
  -0.066* 
(0.066) 
  
BOTTOM 3Q CFO 
TOP Q CEO 
 -0.039 
(0.231) 
  -0.044 
(0.285) 
 
TOP Q CFO 
BOTTOM 3Q CEO 
 -0.040 
(0.200) 
  -0.039 
(0.304) 
 
TOP Q CFO 
TOP Q CEO 
 -0.134*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.178*** 
(0.000) 
 
TOP 3Q CFO 
BOTTOM Q CEO 
  0.024 
(0.447) 
  0.027 
(0.480) 
BOTTOM Q CFO 
TOP 3Q CEO 
  0.077** 
(0.028) 
  0.141*** 
(0.003) 
BOTTOM Q CFO 
BOTTOM Q CEO 
  0.071 
(0.101) 
  0.050 
(0.349) 
INCENTIVES 
AVERSTKCOMP 0.229** 
(0.013) 
0.225** 
(0.013) 
0.254*** 
(0.007) 
0.304*** 
(0.007) 
0.308*** 
(0.006) 
0.343*** 
(0.003) 
AVERBONUS -0.032 
(0.806) 
-0.055 
(0.680) 
-0.048 
(0.719) 
0.039 
(0.813) 
0.028 
(0.865) 
0.039 
(0.815) 
LOSS 0.083* 
(0.082) 
0.076 
(0.112) 
0.076* 
(0.098) 
0.112** 
(0.044) 
0.101* 
(0.068) 
0.107** 
(0.044) 
LEVERAGE -0.117* 
(0.067) 
-0.121* 
(0.062) 
-0.100 
(0.126) 
-0.025 
(0.752) 
-0.025 
(0.754) 
0.003 
(0.966) 
OPPORTUNITIES 
SECTION 
302 
0.109*** 
(0.006) 
0.113*** 
(0.005) 
0.120*** 
(0.002) 
0.109** 
(0.034) 
0.112** 
(0.033) 
0.120** 
(0.017) 
PERCAUDITFEES -0.163 
(0.106) 
-0.141 
(0.174) 
-0.155 
(0.123) 
-0.190 
(0.152) 
-0.159 
(0.244) 
-0.173 
(0.188) 
CONTROL 
SIZE -0.003 
(0.770) 
-0.005 
(0.653) 
-0.003 
(0.809) 
-0.004 
(0.798) 
-0.006 
(0.662) 
-0.002 
(0.904) 
MTB 0.059*** 
(0.008) 
0.060*** 
(0.009) 
0.060*** 
(0.008) 
0.046 
(0.102) 
0.048* 
(0.090) 
0.048* 
(0.083) 
ROA 1.504*** 
(0.000) 
1.502*** 
(0.000) 
1.501*** 
(0.000) 
2.204*** 
(0.000) 
2.182*** 
(0.000) 
2.199*** 
(0.000) 
CFO GENDER 0.061* 
(0.066) 
0.050 
(0.130) 
0.055* 
(0.081) 
0.046 
(0.271) 
0.036 
(0.384) 
0.039 
(0.320) 
CEO GENDER -0.235*** 
(0.004) 
-0.232*** 
(0.004) 
-0.228*** 
(0.003) 
-0.244** 
(0.022) 
-0.238** 
(0.021) 
-0.224** 
(0.021) 
Observations 763 763 763 782 782 782 
R-squared 19.0% 19.1% 19.0% 17.1% 17.2% 17.5% 
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TABLE 7  
Interaction between Visual and Verbal Cues for Honesty 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on matched CFOs 
(CEOs) visual and verbal cues (Panel A) (Panel B).  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Incentives/opportunities/control variables are excluded from tables for brevity and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
Panel A: CFO VISUAL/VERBAL 
VARIABLE DICHEV REM1 REM2 
ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
BASELINE: <MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN VISUAL 
>= MEDIAN VERBAL 
0.004 
(0.685) 
  -0.007 
(0.846) 
  -0.007 
(0.879) 
  
         
>=MEDIAN VISUAL 
<MEDIAN VERBAL 
0.003 
(0.723) 
  -0.001 
(0.976) 
  0.002 
(0.950) 
  
         
>=MEDIAN VISUAL 
>=MEDIAN VERBAL 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
  -0.058* 
(0.066) 
  -0.084** 
(0.030) 
  
         
BOTTOM 3Q VISUAL 
TOP Q VERBAL 
 -0.030*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.049 
(0.151) 
  -0.064 
(0.133) 
 
         
TOP Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 3Q VERBAL 
 -0.030*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.067** 
(0.014) 
  -0.082** 
(0.015) 
 
         
TOP Q VISUAL 
TOP Q VERBAL 
 -0.014 
(0.271) 
  -0.075 
(0.107) 
  -0.082 
(0.152) 
 
         
TOP 3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM Q VERBAL 
  0.034*** 
(0.001) 
  0.078*** 
(0.009) 
  0.119*** 
(0.001) 
         
BOTTOM Q VISUAL 
TOP 3Q VERBAL 
  0.036*** 
(0.000) 
  0.107*** 
(0.002) 
  0.147*** 
(0.001) 
         
BOTTOM Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM Q VERBAL 
  0.029** 
(0.037) 
  0.050 
(0.342) 
  0.106* 
(0.097) 
         
Observations 800 800 800 764 764 764 783 783 783 
R-squared 12.9% 13.6% 14.4% 17.2% 17.5% 18.3% 15.9% 15.9% 17.3% 
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TABLE 7 – continued 
Interaction between Visual and Verbal Cues for Honesty 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of earnings management measures on matched CFOs 
(CEOs) visual and verbal cues (Panel A) (Panel B).  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Incentives/opportunities/control variables are excluded from tables for brevity and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
 
Panel B: CEO VISUAL/VERBAL 
VARIABLE DICHEV REM1 REM2 
ATTITUDE/RATIONALIZATION 
BASELINE: <MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN 
VISUAL 
< MEDIAN 
VERBAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 
3Q 
VERBAL 
TOP 3Q 
VISUAL 
TOP 3Q 
VERBAL 
<MEDIAN VISUAL 
>= MEDIAN VERBAL 
-0.016* 
(0.091) 
  0.011 
(0.752) 
  -0.036 
(0.397) 
  
         
>=MEDIAN VISUAL 
<MEDIAN VERBAL 
0.005 
(0.626) 
  0.004 
(0.891) 
  -0.005 
(0.899) 
  
         
>=MEDIAN VISUAL 
>=MEDIAN VERBAL 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.032 
(0.307) 
  -0.085** 
(0.027) 
  
         
BOTTOM 3Q VISUAL 
TOP Q VERBAL 
 -0.009 
(0.280) 
  -0.015 
(0.643) 
  -0.038 
(0.346) 
 
         
TOP Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM 3Q 
VERBAL 
 0.008 
(0.450) 
  -0.037 
(0.260) 
  -0.035 
(0.421) 
 
         
TOP Q VISUAL 
TOP Q VERBAL 
 -0.029*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.082** 
(0.020) 
  -0.132*** 
(0.001) 
 
         
TOP 3Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM Q VERBAL 
  0.030*** 
(0.002) 
  0.068** 
(0.035) 
  0.105*** 
(0.009) 
         
BOTTOM Q VISUAL 
TOP 3Q VERBAL 
  0.008 
(0.350) 
  0.035 
(0.256) 
  0.015 
(0.698) 
         
BOTTOM Q VISUAL 
BOTTOM Q VERBAL 
  0.035** 
(0.018) 
  0.059 
(0.199) 
  0.083 
(0.143) 
         
Observations 802 802 802 766 766 766 785 785 785 
R-squared 12.9% 12.3% 13.1% 17.8% 18.2% 18.3% 16.5% 16.7% 16.8% 
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TABLE 8 
Earnings Response Coefficients 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs) for 
honesty/humility scores above/below median.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
MEDIAN 
VARIABLE CFO CEO VISUAL/VERBAL CFO/CEO 
VISUAL VERBAL VISUAL VERBAL CFO CEO VISUAL VERBAL 
SUE*<MEDIAN 
HONESTY/HUMILITY 
0.003* 0.004* 0.007*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.062) (0.053) (0.000) (0.057) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) 
SUE*>=MEDIAN 
HONESTY/HUMILITY 
0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.517) (0.465) (0.549) (0.561) (0.540) (0.551) (0.586) (0.533) 
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.214) (0.122) (0.127) (0.136) (0.154) (0.143) (0.205) (0.142) 
Observations 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077 
R-squared 7.6% 7.2% 7.4% 7.5% 7.2% 7.2% 7.4% 7.1% 
 
